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Smart Homes:  
The Next Fourth Amendment Frontier 
Christina A. Robinson* 
 
 
Under the third-party search doctrine, an individual does not have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in information he or she 
voluntarily discloses to third parties. “Always on” in-home 
technology creates recordings of unsuspecting consumers in their 
most intimate spaces and sends them to third party companies and 
their affiliates, which makes this information subject to 
warrantless search by law enforcement under the third-party 
search doctrine. The third-party search doctrine is ill-suited to the 
digital age, where consumers are routinely required to volunteer 
information to third parties in order to access digital content. This 
Note suggests that a warrant should be required where the 
government attempts to search “always on” in-home technology. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. 
Any sound that [a person] made, above the level of a very 
low whisper, would be picked up by it; moreover, so long 
as he remained within the field of vision which the metal 
plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. 
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were 
being watched at any given moment. How often, or on 
what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any 
individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable 
that they watched everybody all the time. But at any rate 
they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to. 
You had to live—did live, from habit that became 
instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made 
was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement 
scrutinized.1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
Government surveillance is omnipresent in George Orwell’s famous 
book, 1984. In the novel, home appliances simultaneously deliver digital 
content to the protagonist, Winston Smith, and surveil his every move.2 
As a result, Winston knows he must be ever vigilant of his words and 
actions, even inside his own home. Orwell’s novel was written in 1949 as 
a glimpse into a potentially totalitarian future,3 but over thirty years after 
the year 1984 how far away are we from Orwell’s dystopia becoming our 
reality? 
The scary truth may be that new “always on” in-home technology may 
be bringing us closer to Orwell’s world than we realize. The Amazon Echo 
Dot controversy in two murder investigations provides an easy example. 
The Echo Dot is a relatively cheap smart home appliance—or, as you 
might call it, a Christmas present. The device is designed to remain 
powered on, always listening for the command word, “Alexa,” which 
allows the user to control music and command smart home devices using 
just his or her voice.4 After voice activation the device records sound in 
 
1 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 4 (1949). 
2 Id. 
3 Colin Marshall, George Orwell Explains in a Revealing 1944 Letter Why He’d Write 
1984, OPEN CULTURE (Apr. 17, 2018), http://www.openculture.com/2014/01/george-
orwell-explains-in-a-revealing-1944-letter-why-hed-write-1984.html. 
4 Eliott C. McLaughlin & Keith Allen, Alexa, Can You Help with This Murder Case?, 
CNN (Dec. 28, 2018), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/28/tech/amazon-echo-alexa-bentonv 
ille-arkansas-murder-case-trnd.  
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the area around it for brief durations, and these recordings are stored by 
Amazon.5 
Two murder investigations in which the government requested that 
Amazon release recordings made by the Echo Dot inside the suspects’ 
homes raise an important question: Will the Echo Dot and similar 
technology lead to the erosion of Fourth Amendment protection inside the 
home? This Note discusses the implications of “always on” in-home 
technology on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part II expounds on the 
privacy implications posed by the Echo Dot and similar “always on” in-
home technology. Part III explains the current status of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence on the issue. Part IV provides suggested 
solutions, and Part V concludes with final thoughts. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
A. Alexa, Set an Alarm for 2020   
 
Smart devices are nearly ubiquitous in modern society. They do 
everything from helping us check the weather to reading us the morning 
news. A report by the Consumer Technology Association estimates that 
the majority of households in the United States, a whopping sixty-nine 
percent or 83 million households, own at least one smart home device; 
eighteen percent or 22 million households own more than one smart 
device.6 Berg Insight, a Swedish research firm, estimates that 63 million 
American homes will qualify as “smart” homes by 2022.7 Over twenty-
five percent of American households owned a smart home speaker in 
2019, and that number is growing rapidly.8 The Amazon Echo and the 
Google Home are the most common smart speakers with the Apple 
HomePod and other smart speakers close behind.9 The United States has 
 
5 Id. 
6 Chuck Martin, Smart Home Technology Hits 69% Penetration in U.S., MEDIAPOST 
(Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/341320/smart-home-
technology-hits-69-penetration-in-us.html. 
7 Patrick Austin, What Will Smart Homes Look Like 10 Years From Now?, TIME (July 
25, 2019), https://time.com/5634791/smart-homes-future/. 
8 Sarah Perez, Over A Quarter of US Adults Now Own a Smart Speaker Typically an 
Amazon Echo, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 8, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/08/over-a-
quarter-of-u-s-adults-now-own-a-smart-speaker-typically-an-amazon-echo/. 
9 Id.  
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the highest market penetration for smart speakers of any other country in 
the world followed by China and the United Kingdom.10 
But how do these devices work? With seven microphones, the 
Amazon Echo Dot, like other “always on” technology, voice-activates 
when it hears its command word, “Alexa.”11 The device is equipped with 
sensors to hear users from any direction for up to twenty feet.12 When the 
Echo Dot is activated a blue light appears, and a tone can be heard that 
indicates the device is ready to make a user query.13 After hearing the 
command word, the Echo Dot creates a recording of the user query and 
any sound around it.14 Once the command and any accompanying sounds 
have been recorded, they are saved on Amazon’s servers and can be 
reviewed (and deleted) manually by the user.15 Importantly, even though 
the Echo Dot is not recording when the device has not been activated with 
the command word, it is still on and “always listening” for the command 
word at all times.16 
The Amazon Echo Dot and other smart speakers are easy examples of 
“always on” in-home technology, but “always on” devices that have the 
ability to record in a home can and do come in many forms. Other “always 
on” devices that can create recordings inside a home include the Google 
Chrome browser, the Xbox Kinect, the Samsung Smart TV, and Mattel’s 
Hello Barbie.17 All of these devices save audio clips immediately before 
and during user queries.18 
 
10 Shanhong Liu, Smart Home Voice Assistants Installed Base Share 2017-2019, by 
Country, STATISTA (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/878650/worldwide-
smart-speaker-installed-base-by-country/. 
11 McLaughlin, supra note 4. 
12 Christopher Mele, Bid for Access to Amazon Echo Audio in Murder Case Raises 
Privacy Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/28/ 
business/amazon-echo-murder-case-arkansas.html. 
13 Raphael Davidian, Alexa and Third Parties’ Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. ONLINE 58, 59–60 (2017), http://www.americancriminallawreview 
.com/files/5114/9515/4188/ALEXA_AND_THIRD_PARTIES_REASONABLE_EXPE
CTATION_OF_PRIVACY_FINAL.pdf. 
14 Mele, supra note 12. 
15 Davidian, supra note 13, at 58. 
16 Id. at 59. Indeed, that is why this technology is said to be “always on.” It is also worth 
noting that the device may accidentally be triggered to record by mistake. For example, if 
someone in the vicinity says the name “Alex,” the device may activate and trigger a 
recording. 
17 Letter from Marc Rotenberg et al., Exec. Dir., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., to Att’y Gen. 
Lynch & Chairwoman Ramirez, 3 (July 10, 2015), https://epic.org/privacy/internet/ 
ftc/EPIC-Letter-FTC-AG-Always-On.pdf. 
18 Arielle M. Rediger, Always-Listening Technologies: Who Is Listening and What Can 
Be Done About It?, 29 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 229, 231 (2017).  
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Differences in software allow some of these devices even to record 
audio clips of their surroundings when queries are not being made.19 For 
example, in 2015 Google conceded that its Chrome browser contained 
code that regularly recorded private communications by turning on a 
microphone that was actively listening to a user’s room without the user’s 
knowledge or consent.20 Similarly, the Xbox Kinect tracked users’ 
gestures, heartbeats, and facial expressions when it was turned on. But 
even when turned off, the Xbox Kinect monitored conversations taking 
place around it.21 The Samsung TV routinely recorded private consumer 
communications, both related and unrelated to the user query, and sent the 
recordings to its third-party voice-to-text processor without encryption.22 
In fact, when information surfaced in 2015 that Samsung’s voice-to-text 
processing sent users’ private communications to third parties, the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center filed a complaint with the Federal 
Trade Commission against Samsung, alleging violations of consumer 
privacy and wiretapping laws.23 By far, the most disturbing of the in-home 
recording devices is the Hello Barbie, which used a built-in microphone 
to record and transmit information gathered through conversations with 
children to its toy conglomerate, Mattel, to analyze the child’s likes and 
dislikes.24 
Many consumers seem to be shocked to find out that their private 
communications are being recorded by the devices in their homes.25 The 
Electronic Privacy Information Center eloquently laid out concerns about 
the privacy implications of these “always on” devices and others in a letter 
to Attorney General Lynch and Chairwoman Ramirez in July 2015: 
Americans do not expect that the devices in their homes 
will persistently record everything they say. By 
introducing ‘always on’ voice recording into ordinary 
consumer products such as computers, televisions, and 
toys, companies are listening to consumers in their most 
private spaces. It is unreasonable to expect consumers to 
 
19 Letter from Marc Rotenberg et al., supra note 17, at 2–5. 
20 Id. at 2. 
21 Id. at 3. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 1; Mike Snider, FTC: Vizio Smart TVs Spied on What Viewers Watched, USA 
TODAY (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2017/02/06/vizi 
o-pay-22m-smart-tv-data-gathering/97553144/. The Federal Trade Commission has not 
announced any action on the complaint as of this writing, but Samsung did issue a statement 
after the FTC complaint was filed saying that the voice-recognition feature was intended 
to enhance the user experience and it could be disabled. 
24 Letter from Marc Rotenberg et al., supra note 17, at 2. 
25 Id. at 3.  
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monitor their every word in front of their home 
electronics. It is also genuinely creepy.26 
But if consumers are shocked to find out that these recordings are 
being made at all, how might they feel if they knew the recordings could 
also be turned over to law enforcement? 
B. Alexa, Can You Solve This Murder Mystery? 
On November 22, 2015, police from the Bentonville Police 
Department in Arkansas found Victor Collins dead in a hot tub at the home 
of James Bates.27 After investigators discovered signs of a struggle, Bates 
was charged with murder.28 One witness said music had been streaming 
from the house that night,29 and during the search of his house police found 
an Amazon Echo Dot on Bates’ kitchen counter.30 Prosecutors served 
Amazon with a warrant to obtain all audio recordings made from Bates’ 
Echo Dot in hopes they might contain information about Collins’ death.31 
Amazon fought the warrant on the grounds that it was overbroad, stating 
at first that it “[would] not release customer information without a valid 
and binding legal demand properly served on us[,]”32 but ultimately with 
Bates’ consent, Amazon turned the recordings over to prosecutors.33 After 
receiving the recordings from the Echo Dot, the main prosecutor, Nathan 
Smith, began to doubt whether Bates actually committed the murder 
stating, “I can’t stand in front of a jury and ask them to convict someone 
 
26 Id. at 4–5. 
27 Mele, supra note 12. 
28 Id.  
29 Amazon Hands Over Echo ‘Murder’ Data, BBC (Apr. 17, 2018), http://www.bbc. 
com/news/technology-39191056. 
30 Mele, supra note 12. 
31 See id.; see also Jay Stanley, The Privacy Threat from Always-On Microphones like 
the Amazon Echo, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog 
/privacy-technology/privacy-threat-always-microphones-amazon-echo?redirect=blog/fre 
e-future/privacy-threat-always-microphones-amazon-echo. 
32 Arkansas Prosecutors Drop Murder Case That Hinged On Evidence From Amazon 
Echo, NPR (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/29/56730 
5812/arkansas-prosecutors-drop-murder-case-that-hinged-on-evidence-from-amazon-ech 
o. Investigators also used information from a smart water meter on Bates’ property to 
decide to file charges against him. The smart water meter showed a suspiciously large 
consumption of water being used in the middle of the night. 
33 Shona Gosh, Amazon Handed Over Alexa Recordings to the Police in a Murder Case, 
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-has-handed-alexa-
recordings-to-police-in-an-arkansas-murder-case-2017-3.  
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beyond a reasonable doubt if I myself have a reasonable doubt [about who 
committed this crime].”34 Smith eventually moved to dismiss the case.35 
Alexa was asked to testify in a second murder investigation in 2017. 
On January 27, 2017, Jenna Pellegrini and Christine Sullivan were stabbed 
to death in Farmington, New Hampshire, and Timothy Verrill was charged 
with their murder.36 An Amazon Echo Dot was sitting on the kitchen 
counter, and Judge Steven Houran ordered Amazon to turn over the 
recordings made from January 27, 2017 to January 29, 2017.37 Amazon 
similarly objected to the court order on the basis that it is overbroad and 
inappropriate.38 The case went to trial in October 2019 but resulted in a 
mistrial.39 
Cases like these raise questions about data from the Amazon Echo Dot 
and other “always on” in-home devices: Can recordings of our most 
intimate spaces be turned over to law enforcement officers without our 
consent––or a warrant? 
III. STATEMENT OF THE LAW 
A. Privacy Protection Under The Fourth Amendment 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no [w]arrants shall issue but upon probable cause . . . describing the 
place to be searched, and the . . . things to be seized.”40 In the two centuries 
following its enactment, the Supreme Court used the text of the Fourth 
 
34 Nicole Chavez, Arkansas Judge Drops Murder Charge in Amazon Echo Case, CNN 
(Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/30/us/amazon-echo-arkansas-murder-case-
dismissed/index.html?no-st=1526532257. 
35 Id. 
36 Harrison Thorp, Farmington Double-Murder Trial Postponed till October, could Last 
Six Weeks, THE ROCHESTER VOICE (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.therochestervoice.com 
/farmington-double-murder-trial-postponed-till-october-could-last-six-weeks-cms-11914. 
37 Meagan Flynn, Police Think Alexa May Have Witnessed a New Hampshire Double 
Homicide. Now They Want Amazon to Turn Her Over, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/14/police-think-alexa-may-have-witnes 
sed-new-hampshire-double-slaying-now-they-want-amazon-turn-her-over/; Perez, supra 
note 8. 
38 Perez, supra note 8. 
39 Kyle Stucker, ‘We failed’: Mistrial Declared in Double-Murder Case, FOSTERS.COM 
(Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.fosters.com/news/20191031/we-failed-mistrial-declared-in-
double-murder-case 
40 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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Amendment to craft a set of procedural rules to balance law enforcement 
needs against individual privacy interests.41 The warrant clause of the 
Fourth Amendment mandates that a warrant be issued based on a finding 
of probable cause by a neutral magistrate.42 In the absence of a warrant, 
the government must articulate one of several exceptions to the warrant 
requirement or risk the inadmissibility of evidence at trial.43 The 
fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment “is to safeguard the 
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by 
government officials.”44 The Supreme Court is charged with providing the 
same degree of Fourth Amendment protection today as that afforded when 
it was adopted,45 yet Fourth Amendment standards have struggled to keep 
pace with evolving technology that allows for new government 
surveillance techniques.46 
B. The Katz Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Standard 
For three decades, government surveillance primarily triggered a 
Fourth Amendment violation under the “trespass doctrine.”47 The trespass 
doctrine invokes Fourth Amendment protections when the government 
physically invades an individual’s property without a warrant.48 For 
example, in Silverman v. United States the Supreme Court found that the 
government violated the Fourth Amendment by listening to the 
defendant’s private communicates using a “spike mike” placed on the 
defendant’s home-heating duct because the government had physically 
penetrated his property.49 However, wiretapping technology capable of 
recording private conversations in the absence of a physical intrusion was 
soon introduced.50 With the advent of this new wiretapping technology, 
the Supreme Court was forced to rethink the trespass doctrine and 
articulate a new Fourth Amendment standard. 
Initially, in Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court decided that 
Fourth Amendment protections did not apply to information obtained by 
 
41 See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 
536 (2005). 
42 See id. at 536–37.  
43 See id. 
44 Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City and City of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
45 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001). 
46 See Jace C. Gatewood, It’s Raining Katz and Jones: The Implications of United States 
v. Jones–A Case of Sound and Fury, 33 PACE L. REV. 683, 683–85 (2013). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510–11 (1961). 
50 David A. Harris, Riley v. California and the Beginning of the End for the Third-Party 
Search Doctrine, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 927–28 (2016). 
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the government in the absence of a physical trespass.51 However, Justice 
Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead contained seeds of change that would 
revolutionize Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.52 Justice Brandeis 
believed that the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to keep pace 
with advances in modern technology, which would create new possibilities 
for the government to invade individual privacy: 
When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were 
adopted, . . . [f]orce and violence were then the only 
means known to man by which a government could 
directly effect self-incrimination . . . . But ‘time works 
change, brings into existence new conditions and 
purposes.’ Subtler and more far-reaching means of 
invading privacy have become available to the 
government. Discovery and invention have made it 
possible for the government . . . to obtain disclosure in 
court of what is whispered in the closet . . . . The makers 
of our Constitution . . . . sought to protect Americans in 
their beliefs, their emotions, and their sensations. They 
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let 
alone––the most comprehensive of rights and the right 
most valued by civilized men. To protect, that right, every 
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the 
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, 
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.53 
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court overruled the majority’s 
opinion in Olmstead, providing that the Fourth Amendment protects 
individuals even in the absence of a physical intrusion and emphasizing 
that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”54 In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Harlan articulated the standard that continues 
to govern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence today: A Fourth Amendment 
violation occurs where law enforcement officials infringe on an 
individual’s subjective expectation of privacy so long as society deems 
that expectation to be objectively reasonable.55 
An individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is greatest in his or 
her home.56 In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the 
 
51 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473–478 (1928). 
52 Id. at 471–85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
53 Id. 
54 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
55 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
56 See Kerr, supra note 41, at 536. 
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government’s use of a thermal-imaging device without a warrant to 
discover information about the contents of a home, which would be 
otherwise unknown without a physical intrusion, violated the Fourth 
Amendment.57 In an impassioned majority opinion, Justice Scalia 
emphasized the importance of safeguarding privacy in the home in the face 
of advances in modern technology.58 He depicted protection of the home 
from prying government eyes as the constitutional minimum reasonable 
expectation of privacy demanded by the Fourth Amendment.59 Justice 
Scalia rejected the argument that a failure to discern intimate details about 
the home prevented a Fourth Amendment violation because “[i]n the 
home, our cases show, all details are intimate details[.]”60 
C. The Foundations of the Third-Party Search Doctrine 
Under the Katz test, an individual has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information that he or she voluntarily discloses to third parties 
under the third-party search doctrine.61 The third-party search doctrine was 
first discussed at length in United States v. Miller.62 In Miller, the Supreme 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect information that 
has been revealed to third parties, even if the information was revealed on 
the assumption that it would be used for a limited purpose and that the 
third party would maintain its privacy.63 The Court found that Miller had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily 
disclosed to his bank, and the government could lawfully subpoena his 
bank records as evidence to be used against him in a criminal 
prosecution.64 In other words, “[t]he depositor [assumes] the risk in 
revealing his affairs to another[] that the information [would] be 
conveyed” to the government.65 
The Supreme Court expanded the scope of the third-party search 
doctrine to include information voluntarily revealed to a phone company 
 
57 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001). 
58 Id. at 40 (advocating that it would be foolish to assert that privacy protection under 
the Fourth Amendment has been unaffected by the advance of technology). 
59 Id. at 28. By contrast, an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
anything in “open fields” or in the plain view of a police officer. In Oliver v. United States, 
466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984), the Supreme Court held that an individual does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information in “open fields,” where any member of 
the public can look.  
60 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37. Importantly, the scope of Kyllo is limited to new technology 
that is not in general public use. 
61 Id. at 27–28. 
62 Harris, supra note 50, at 904. 
63 Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435, 443–46 (1976). 
64 Id. at 445–46.  
65 Id. at 443. 
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in Smith v. Maryland.66 The Court reasoned that telephone users have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the outward numbers they dial 
because users know they must convey information about these numbers to 
telephone companies, which record this information for legitimate 
business purposes.67 The Court distinguished this case from Katz by 
saying that the device employed by the government registered only the 
numbers dialed, not the contents of the communication.68 The Court also 
rejected the argument that the numbers should be entitled to greater 
protection because they were dialed using a phone from inside the 
defendant’s house because, “[r]egardless of his location, [the] petitioner 
had to convey that number to the telephone company in precisely the same 
way if he wished to complete his call.”69 Citing Miller, the Court affirmed 
that an individual who discloses information to a third party assumes the 
risk that this information will be provided to law enforcement.70 
D. Advances in Technology Beget Changing Attitudes Toward the 
Third-Party Search Doctrine 
The Supreme Court readdressed the third-party search doctrine in 
United States v. Jones. The issue in Jones was whether the warrantless 
GPS tracking of a person’s car constituted a Fourth Amendment violation. 
At first, the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test was used in the 
Supreme Court’s decisions involving GPS technology to track suspects.71 
United States v. Knotts and United States v. Karo were factually similar to 
Jones—all three cases involved government surveillance of the 
defendant’s movements using GPS technology—yet both Knotts and Karo 
were decided on the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard.72 
But in a surprising turn of events, Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, sidestepped the Katz analysis and instead revived the trespass 
doctrine.73 Justice Scalia distinguished Knotts and Karo from Jones by 
 
66 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46, (1979). 
67 Id. at 743. 
68 Id. at 741. 
69 Id. at 743. 
70 Id. at 744. 
71 The two cases on point are United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) and 
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). In Knotts, the Supreme Court held that 
tracking a defendant by placing a device inside a container he subsequently acquired did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment because the suspect did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements on public thoroughfares.71 On similar facts in 
Karo, the Court held that tracking the defendant when his car was parked inside a private 
residence did violate his reasonable expectation of privacy.71  
72 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408–10 (2012).  
73 Id. 
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saying that a trespass had not occurred in either case because the 
government placed the tracking device on the property before the 
defendant took possession of it.74 Justice Scalia made clear that in Jones 
the government placed its tracking device on the defendant’s car after he 
had taken possession of it, which made the case ripe for determining it 
based on the trespass doctrine.75 Because a car constituted an “effect” 
under the Fourth Amendment the government physically trespassed onto 
the defendant’s car after he had already taken possession of it, the 
government violated the Fourth Amendment under the trespass doctrine.76 
In a famous concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor agreed that the 
trespass doctrine was sufficient to decide Jones, but she criticized the 
majority for being shortsighted: “In cases of electronic or other novel 
means of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on 
property, the majority opinion’s trespassory test may provide little 
guidance.”77 She then challenged Justice Scalia’s notion that people have 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the sum of their public movements 
and laid out several reasons why a Katz inquiry was relevant in Jones: GPS 
monitoring allows the government access to information about one’s most 
private associations; GPS tracking information can be stored and mined 
by the government for years to come; the information is cheap to gather so 
it evades normal checks on law enforcement officers; and the awareness 
that the government might be watching chills associational and expressive 
freedoms.78 In light of these attributes, she said she would ask “whether 
people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and 
aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or 
less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”79 
Justice Sotomayor then addressed what she believed to be the more 
important underlying issue in Jones, which was the inevitable need to re-
evaluate the third-party search doctrine in light of advances in modern 
technology.80 She believed that allowing the third-party search doctrine to 
continue to control would give the government unchecked power over 
routinely disclosed consumer data: 
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties . . . This 
 
74 Id. at 408–09.  
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 401.  
77 Id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people 
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to 
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks . . . I would not assume that all information 
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a 
limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection.81 
Thus, as Justice Sotomayor noted, the majority in Jones effectively 
left open the question of whether warrantless government surveillance to 
track the aggregate of an individual’s movements in the absence of a 
physical intrusion would violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence indicated that the third-party search doctrine 
should be re-evaluated in light of advances in modern technology. 
E. Legal Trends Move Toward Heightened Protection for Digital 
Information 
Around the same time as Jones, some lower courts began to treat 
digital information with a heightened expectation of privacy. For example, 
in United States v. Mitchell, the Eleventh Circuit held that the detention of 
the defendant’s computer for a duration outside the scope of the warrant 
violated the Fourth Amendment, especially because a computer hard drive 
is “the digital equivalent of its owner’s home, capable of holding a 
universe of private information.”82 In United States v. Warshak, the Sixth 
Circuit held that a subscriber maintains a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the contents of emails stored, sent, or received through an 
Internet Service Provider, and the government may only compel the 
Internet Service Provider to turn over the contents of the subscriber’s 
emails by first obtaining a warrant.83 
The trend toward treating digital information with a heightened 
expectation of privacy continued in the United States Supreme Court in 
2014 with Riley v. California. In Riley, the Court took a firm position to 
protect digital information by imposing a warrant requirement on cell 
phone searches incident to arrest.84 The Court stated that “[m]odern cell 
phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those 
implicated by the search of [other physical items]” because of their 
immense storage capacity, the tendency that information derived from a 
 
81 Id. 
82 United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kansas v. 
Rupnick, 280 Kan. 720, 125 P.3d 541, 552 (2005)). 
83 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010). 
84 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).  
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cell phone search could reveal much more about a suspect’s personal life 
in combination than in isolation, and the fact that Cloud computing 
allowed law enforcement to effectively search information contained in 
the home.85 
The most recent United States Supreme Court case to address the issue 
of digital privacy was Carpenter v. United States.86 The case challenged 
the application of the third-party search doctrine to cell-site location 
information (CSLI).87 Prior to the opinion, state and federal courts 
remained divided on issues relating to the third-party search doctrine.88 
United States v. Davis exemplifies this split. A majority of the en banc 
Eleventh Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Smith and 
Miller were controlling and, thus, the defendant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his cell-site location information.89 However, 
two separate lower court concurrences called on the Supreme Court to 
clarify the scope of Smith and Miller. One concurrence written by Judge 
Rosenbaum was particularly compelling: 
In our time, unless a person is willing to live ‘off the grid’ 
it is nearly impossible to avoid disclosing the most 
personal of information to third-party service providers 
on a constant basis, just to navigate daily life. And the 
thought that the government should be able to access such 
information without the basic protection that a warrant 
offers is nothing less than chilling . . . .90 
Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Carpenter on June 22, 2018.91 In the case, the Assistant United States 
Attorney investigating a string of robberies requested a court order to 
provide 152 days’ worth of Carpenter’s historical cell-site location data 
under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).92 Under the 
Stored Communications Act, an order may be issued when the government 
“offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, 
or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an 
 
85 Id. at 2488–92. 
86 Carpenter v. United States, 585 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
87 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 
2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (No. 16-402) 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/16-402-cert-petition.pdf. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 12. 
90 Id. 
91 Carpenter v. United States, 585 S. Ct. 2211 (2018). 
92 Id. at 2212. 
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ongoing criminal investigation.”93 The “reasonable grounds” standard 
requires significantly less than probable cause.94 Federal magistrate judges 
issued two court orders directing MetroPCS and Sprint to disclose 
Carpenter’s location information.95 
Carpenter was charged with six counts of robbery and an additional 
six counts of carrying a firearm during a federal crime of violence.96 Prior 
to trial, Carpenter moved to suppress the cell-site data provided by the 
wireless carriers on the basis that the government’s failure to obtain a 
warrant prior to accessing his data violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights.97 The district court denied the motion, the government relied on the 
location information at trial, and Carpenter was convicted.98 The Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.99 
The Supreme Court held in Carpenter that obtaining CSLI was a 
search under the Fourth Amendment and required a warrant in order to be 
valid.100 The Court began its analysis by reaffirming that individuals have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical 
movements.101 Then, the Court addressed the third-party search doctrine, 
which had been the government’s main argument for obtaining the 
information.102 The Court distinguished in nature and scope the search that 
occurred in Carpenter from the foundational third-party search doctrine 
cases, stating that “there is a world of difference between the limited types 
of person information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive 
chronicle of location information casually collected [today] by wireless 
carriers.”103 
 
93 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. §2703(d) (2019)). 
94 Id. at 2221 (“The Government acquired the cell-site records pursuant to a court order 
issued under the Stored Communications Act, which required the Government to show 
‘reasonable grounds’ for believing that the records were ‘relevant and material to an 
ongoing investigation.’ That showing falls well short of the probable cause required for a 
warrant.”) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §2703(d) (2019)). 
95 Id. at 2212. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 2212–13. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 2221. 
101 Id. at 2219.  
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 2217–19 (“Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that 
the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to 
Fourth Amendment protection. Whoever the suspect [of a crime] turns out to be, he has 
effectively been tailed every moment of every day . . . and the police may—in the 
Government’s view—call upon the results of that surveillance without regard to the 
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Next, the Court distinguished the voluntary consent as being of a 
different kind than the foundational third-party search doctrine cases.104 
The Court stated that “carrying [a cell phone] is indispensable to 
participation in modern society[,]” and a user cannot meaningfully assume 
the risk of volunteering information to a third party because “[a]part from 
disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving 
behind a trail of location data.”105 As a result, the government should have 
been required to obtain a warrant prior to gaining access to Carpenter’s 
cell-site location information.106 However, the Court made explicitly clear 
that its decision in this case was “a narrow one[]” that did not “disturb the 
application of Smith and Miller or call into question conventional 
surveillance techniques . . . .”107 
Thus, the Supreme Court has twice ruled to protect digital information 
derived from cell phones by requiring a warrant be obtained prior to 
gaining access to the user’s information.108 However, the Supreme Court 
has not yet ruled on whether a warrant would be required to access other 
types of digital information such as recordings from smart devices. 
Because the decision in Carpenter was a narrow one, the Court has left 
open the question of how much, if any, digital information from “always 
on” in-home technology would be subject to search by law enforcement 
and whether a warrant would be required to obtain access to this 
information.  
IV. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS 
This Note argues that a warrant should be required when the 
government attempts to search recordings made by “always on” in-home 
technology. This solution is the most complete because it strikes an 
appropriate balance between governmental interests in enforcing the law 
and individual privacy interests: law enforcement officials can obtain 
sensitive digital information so long as they obtain a warrant before doing 
so. 
Notably, this solution comes at the cost of making it more difficult for 
the police to solve crimes by preventing them from acquiring valuable 
evidence in criminal investigations. This begs the question: Should we 
 
constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Only the few without cell phones could escape this 
tireless and absolute surveillance.”). 
104 Id. at 2220. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 2220–21. 
107 Id. at 2220. 
108 Id. at 2221; Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).  
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make it more difficult for the government to obtain access to our most 
private information in order to solve crimes by requiring a warrant be 
issued before doing so? 
The Supreme Court grappled with a similar question when it 
determined whether to apply the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. 
Ohio.109 Applying the exclusionary rule to the states would undoubtedly 
let guilty people walk free by excluding incriminating evidence from 
criminal trials because it was obtained by the police illegally.110 After 
deciding that the exclusionary rule should be applied to the states, Justice 
Clark wrote for the majority in Mapp that, “[t]he criminal goes free, if he 
must, but it is the law that sets him free.”111 In United States v. Leon, the 
Court again confronted the exclusionary rule issue and attempted to 
balance governmental interests against the individual privacy protections 
engrained in the Fourth Amendment.112 In ardent dissent, Justice Brennan 
wrote the following: 
While the machinery of law enforcement and indeed the 
nature of crime itself have changed dramatically since the 
Fourth Amendment became part of the Nation’s 
fundamental law in 1791, what the Framers understood 
then remains true today—that the task of combating crime 
and convicting the guilty will in every era seem of such 
critical and pressing concern that we may be lured by the 
temptations of expediency into forsaking our commitment 
to protecting individual liberty and privacy. It was for that 
very reason that the Framers of the Bill of Rights insisted 
that law enforcement efforts be permanently and 
unambiguously restricted in order to preserve personal 
freedoms. In the constitutional scheme they ordained the 
sometimes unpopular task of ensuring that the 
government’s enforcement efforts remain within the strict 
boundaries fixed by the Fourth Amendment . . . .113 
Thus, while it is true that the solutions suggested in this Note will 
hinder law enforcement officers from solving crimes, as Justice Brennan 
observed, the Fourth Amendment demands protection of individual liberty 
against arbitrary government intrusion. To be clear, this Note does not 
suggest that the government should not be able to obtain access to any 
 
109 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (1961). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 659. 
112 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900 (1984). 
113 Id. at 929–30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
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digital information to aid in criminal investigations––just that it seek a 
warrant before doing so. 
A. Why a Warrant Should be Required for Data from “Always On” 
In-Home Technology 
In analyzing future cases, the Supreme Court would do well to extend 
the precedent set by Riley and Carpenter to data derived from “always on” 
in-home technology. The Court should find that the information derived 
from “always on” in-home technology is akin to that in Carpenter and is 
sensitive in nature and broader in scope than the information collected in 
Smith and Miller. Furthermore, the Court should find that “always on” in-
home technology is akin to the CSLI collected in Carpenter because there 
is no meaningful consent for the collection of data from devices that are 
“always on.” 
The Supreme Court in Carpenter first distinguished the nature and 
scope of the information derived from Smith and Miller as being more 
limited in nature than that of CSLI.114 
The Government’s position fails to contend with the 
seismic shift[] in digital technology [have] made possible 
the tracking of not only Carpenter’s location but also 
everyone else’s, not for a short period but for years and 
years . . . Unlike the nosy neighbor who keeps an eye on 
comings and goings, [Sprint Corporation and its 
competitors] are ever alert, and their memory is nearly 
infallible. There is a world of difference between the 
limited types of personal information addressed in Smith 
and Miller and the exhaustive chronical of location 
information casually collected by wireless carriers 
today.115 
The Court pointed out that the pen register in Smith had limited 
capabilities to reveal identifying information and the checks in Miller were 
negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions, not 
confidential communications.116 The Court in Riley also addressed the 
sensitive nature of information derived from a cell phone and 
distinguished it in several important ways from information derived from 
other physical objects: A cell phone collects in one place many types of 
information that reveal much more in combination than in isolation; a cell 
 
114 Carpenter v. United States, 585 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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phone’s capacity allows even one type of information to reconstruct the 
sum of an individual’s private life; the data on the phone dates back to the 
phone’s purchase or even earlier; and finally, a cell phone allows an 
individual to store in a portable location a great number of records that 
would not be accessible in a physical format.117 
Like in Riley and Carpenter, information derived from “always on” 
in-home technology can be stored by Amazon or its competitors for years 
with infallible memory—smart device company servers also have 
immense storage capabilities, and it is common for recordings taken from 
“always on” devices to be stored for between six months to two years.118 
Also like cell phones, the aggregate of these recordings has the potential 
to reveal much more together than in isolation about an individual’s 
private life and accessing aggregated recordings from a device from inside 
the home could, without a doubt, reveal an individual’s religious, political, 
or sexual habits more than any one recording could in isolation.119 For 
example, an Amazon Echo Dot that is located near a television would 
undoubtedly reveal snippets of any television program playing in the 
background during the user query, which could reveal information about 
the person’s religious, political, or sexual habits. 
“Always on” technology allows law enforcement officers to access 
digital recordings that were produced inside a home. Under normal 
circumstances, law enforcement officers would not be allowed to enter the 
home without a warrant unless one of the well-defined exceptions to the 
warrant requirement applied.120 Law enforcement officers would certainly 
not be allowed to plant a recording device inside a home without a 
warrant.121 But under the third-party search doctrine today, simply because 
the recordings from “always on” in-home devices were released to a third 
party, the government is effectively able to do indirectly what it could not 
do directly: Access recordings of consumers in their most intimate spaces 
without a warrant. Allowing the third-party search doctrine to swallow 
privacy protection in the home goes against the holdings in Riley, in 
Carpenter, and in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Kyllo where he 
emphasized that “[i]n the home, our cases show, all details are intimate 
 
117 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489–90 (2014). 
118 Tim Moynihan, Alexa and Google Home Record What You Say. But What Happens 
to that Data?, WIRED (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/alexa-and-google-
record-your-voice/. 
119 McLaughlin, supra note 4. This problem is further exacerbated when more than one 
device is at issue. For example, as noted above James Bates had both an Amazon Echo Dot 
and a smart water device. 
120 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980). 
121 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510–11 (1961). 
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details[.]”122 Unlike the limited nature of the information in Smith and 
Miller, the fact that these recordings were made inside a home makes the 
likelihood that they contain sensitive information much greater and the 
need to protect this information much more significant. 
The Court in Carpenter also distinguished the information derived 
from a cell phone on the basis that there is no meaningful consent to 
disclose the information to a third party as there was in Smith and Miller.123 
A cell phone automatically generates CSLI when it is powered on without 
any affirmative act on the part of the user, and there is no way to escape it 
doing so other than to remain off the grid.124 As a result, the user does not 
in any meaningful sense volunteer this information to a third party and, 
thus, does not assume the risk of turning over the information to law 
enforcement.125 
Information derived from “always on” in-home technology is also not 
volunteered to a third party in any meaningful sense. When one buys or 
installs a smart speaker or other “always on” in-home device, there is no 
warning label that indicates that the device may be recording you or turned 
over to law enforcement.126 While it is true that cell phones are much more 
prevalent, a significant number of people own “always on” smart devices 
and use them within their homes.127 These individuals do not suspect that 
these devices will be recording them in their most intimate spaces, saving 
those recordings on company servers, or sharing them with third party 
affiliates.128 As a result, the Supreme Court should extend the holdings in 
Riley and in Carpenter to protect information derived from “always on” 
devices used inside a home and find that a warrant is required before this 
information is obtained by law enforcement. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
Under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, recordings from 
“always on” technology made inside a home are not protected from prying 
government eyes under the third-party search doctrine. A warrant should 
be required to obtain recordings from “always on” in-home devices. The 
year 1984 came and went without turning into Orwell’s government 
surveillance nightmare. Today, no one should have to fear that recordings 
from their most intimate spaces can be provided to the government without 
their consent—or a warrant—because of the third-party search doctrine. 
No person should have to be afraid to speak candidly in his or her home 
for fear that “Big Brother is watching.” 
